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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

HAROLD WARREN,

Respondents,
-vs.DIXON RANCH COMPANY, et al.,
Appellants.

Appellant's Brief
NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellants are the Dixon Ranch Company and
certain of the Stockholders who are appealing on behalf
of themselves and the rest of the stockholders.
In the District Court the appellants unsuccessfully
moved to set aside a default judgment entered against
the corporation. After a contested hearing the District
Court denied the motion and the appellants appealed.
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SPECIFICATION OF ERROR
The appellants contend that the District Court erred
as follows:
1. That the District Court abused its discretion in
not allowing the appellants' motion to vacate the default
judgment.

2. In holding that reopening the case would be only
for the purpose of a cross.:action between certain of the
defendants.
The appellants waive the rest of the points raised
in the designation of points.
THE FACTS
The facts as shown on the record of the case are not
in dispute for the most part. The case was a quiet title
action initiated in the District Court of Duchesne County
to quiet title to approximately 1120 acres of valuable oil
property which constitute the entire assets of the defunct
Dixon Ranch Company, a corporation originally organized and authorized to do business within the State of
Utah, (R. 2, 52). The Dixon Ranch Company forfeited
its charter for nonpayment of taxes and has not actively
engaged in business since the year 1934 (R. 52). The
stock in the company had been owned by six stockholders,
all of whom were deceased at the time of the filing of the
action except for Arnold Dixon, (R. 59, 60). Arnold
Dixon at one time had been a director of the company,
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and as such he was the sole surviving director, (R.. 59).
There are now about 20 stockholders as heirs of the
original stockholders (one of whom is Paul Dixon, an
appellant), all but two of whom reside in the vicinity of
Salt Lake and Provo, (R.. 59). On or about the 15th day
of September, 1950 Arnold Dixon purported by quitclaim deed to convey all right, title and interest in and
to said property on behalf of the Dixon R.anch Company
to the Valley Investment Company, (R.. 60). This was
done without notice to and without consulting the other
stockholders. This conveyance is alleged by the appellants to have been obtained fraudulently, and it is also
contended that Arnold Dixon had no authority to make
such a conveyance which purported to convey away and
dissipate the entire assets of the corporation, R.. 68).
The Valley Investment Company was a party to the
action in the District Court ( R.. 2).
At the beginning of the quiet title action concerning
the subject property, Arnold Dixon, the sole surviving
director of the corporation, was served with process individually and as a director and trustee of the Dixon
Ranch Company (R. 6, 7). At no time were any of the
stockholders notified by Arnold Dixon of the pending
suit, (R. 40). As alleged in the affidavit of Paul Dixon,
the elderly Arnold Dixon had for a long time been a
seriously ill man, (R. 40). The only notice the stockholders had of the pending suit was that by chance they
discovered publication of summons in a newspaper on
the 23rd day of August, 1951, the last day of publication, (R. 27, 40). Immediately they wrote to the County
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Clerk for a copy of the complaint and contacted attorney
Phil Hansen to represent their interests and the interests
of the corporation, (R. 40, 41). An answer and counterclaim were filed by mail in the District Court on the
13th day of September, 1951, 21 days after the last date
of publication of summons ( R. 22). According to the
affidavit of attorney Hansen, Mr. Colton, attorney for
the respondent had orally granted him time in which to
answer, (R. 57). The record further shows that the
appellants' answer and counterclaim were stricken upon
motion of the respondent's attorney on the 13th day of
September, 1951, the very day upon which the answer
was filed, (R. 29, 32). The appellants had no notice of
the striking on September 13, or that a default had been
entered against them on the 11th day of July, (R. 40,
57). They had no notice of any of the proceedings until
the findings of fact and conclusions of law and judgment
and decree were mailed to them on the 24th day of
October, 1951, (R. 33, 37).
Immediately upon receipt of judgment and decree,
proceedings were instituted on behalf of the stockholders
and the Dixon Ranch Company to have the default and
judgment set aside and vacated in order that they might
again file an answer to the plaintiff's complaint, (R. 39,
56, 62). After a contested hearing on the motion to set
aside the default judgment the District Court denied the
appellants' rnotion, ( R. 71).
The defense which the appellants assert against the
claim of title of the respondents is that the tax titles
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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upon which the respondents rely are void because no
auditor's affidavit was ever issued and no proper tax
sale proceeding was had, and that the respondent has
not been in possession of the land for the statutory
period, and therefore, could not acquire title by adverse
use, (R. 41).
ARGUJ\IENT
I.

THE CouRT ABUSED ITs DiscRETION IN NoT ALLOWING
THE APPELLANTS'

l\I oTION

To VACATE THE DEFAULT

JUDGMENT.

Rule 60 (b) U.R.C.P. provides that on terms which
are just and in furtherance of justice, the Court may
relieve a party from a final judgment or proceeding on
the grounds of "excusable neglect".
While the granting or withholding of relief rests
largely in the sound discretion of the trial court, this
court will reverse the lower court if that discretion is
abused. Each case must be determined on its own facts.
Rule 60 (b) was patterned after Sec. 104-14-4, U. C.
A. 1943. This statute has been considered on numerous
occasions.
Cutler 1.:s. Haycock, 32 Ut. 254; 90 Pac. 897, the appellants' attorney untimely filed a demurrer to the respondent's complaint and, as here, a default was entered.
Appellant attempted to set aside the default. The District Court refused to vacate the default. The Supreme
Court reversed and in setting aside the default said:
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''That the question whether a default and
judgment should or should not be vacated is one
to be passed on by the trial court, and that it rests
within its sound discretion, has so often been
declared to be the rule of practice that it has become elementary and needs no citation of authorities. It is equally elementary that this discretion
is to be applied to the facts as they appear in each
case, and in the exercise of this discretion, the
aim and object should be the promotion and furtherance of justice and the protection of rights of
all concerned. As has been well said, in all doubtful cases the general rule of courts is to incline
toward granting relief from the default and to
bring about a judgment on the merits. (Citing
Cases) This rule as appears from the authorities,
is of almost universal application and is defeated
only in cases where the default is the result of
inexcusable neglect of the party in default, or
where it would be inequitable to set it aside ...
Good faith and reasonable effort to make defense
are always elements to be considered in each
case.''
" ... Law and courts alike abhor a result that
condemns a party unheard and unless the law unavoidably requires and justice demands it where
a party has not by his own inexcusable neglect
deprived himself of the rights, the courts should
and will, where equity permits, afford relief, to
the end that a party may be given a hearing."

InHurd vs. Ford, 74 Ut. 46; 276 Pac. 908, the trial
court granted the appellants' motion to set aside a default judgment on condition that the appellant turn over
certain property in her possession to the sheriff. This
she refused to do. She appealed from the order of the
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court which denied her motion to vacate the default
judgment. This court reversed saying:
'• ... The discretion lodged in the court by this
statute to set aside a default or to relieve one
from is to be exercised in the furtherance of justice. In doubtful cases the courts will incline toward granting relief from defaults to the end that
a party may have a hearing."
It is submitted that under the rule of these cases
excusable neglect was shown in this case and that the
trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant
appellants' motion. It is shown by the record that the
stockholders of the Dixon Ranch Company had no actual
knowledge that a quiet title action was pending concerning the entire assets of the company. It is conceded that
Arnold Dixon, the sole surviving director was served
with summons individually and on behalf of the Dixon
Ranch Company. Conceding without admitting that it
was proper service upon the corporation, the affidavit
of Paul Dixon alleges that the elderly Arnold Dixon had
been very seriously ill for a long time, and that he failed
to notify any of the other interested members of the
corporation-the stockholders. The affidavit further
shows that the stockholders first had knowledge of the
action by reading publication of summons in a newspaper
dated the 23rd of August, 1951. The very purpose of
publication of summons is to give notice of the action
to interested parties who cannot or have not been served
with process. The affidavit of attorney Hansen states
that during a phone conversation with attorney for the
respondents that respondent's attorney agreed to allow
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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additional time within which the appellants could answer
the complaint. This oral extension was granted without
reference to the fact that the default of the Dixon Ranch
Company had already been entered.
The answer was filed within one day of the time required by the published summons and well within the
time allowed by the oral extension. The striking of the
answer and enry of default were both done without
notice. Appellants had procured counsel and had assumed that their rights were being protected. As soon as
they learned to the contrary they procured new counsel
who promptly sought relief from the default.
A more clear case of excusable neglect is presented
here than in the case cited above where this court granted
relief because Arnold Dixon was seriously ill he did not
inform the stockholders of the pending action. In the
furtherance of justice and the protection of the rights
of all parties concerned, the stockholders should be allowed to defend the action. It is the stockholders of the
Dixon Ranch Company who suffer if the default judgment is allowed to stand. They had no knowledge of the
action because of misfortune and circumstances over
which they had no control. As soon as they learned of
the action they took measures to protect themselves.
Time is of some importance on the question of due
diligence. Rule 60 (b) U.R.C.P. states that a motion for
relief under 60 (b) for excusable neglect ''shall be made
within a reasonable time
. , not more than three
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months nfter the judgment, order or proceeding was
entered or taken.''
One of the standards set forth in the Cutler vs. Haycock case cited above is "good faith and reasonable efforts to make a defense.''
After appellants received notice of the Decree on
October :24th they procured the services of other attorneys for the purpose of having the judgment vacated so
that they could defend the action. On the lOth day of
November, 1951, the motion to set aside the judgment
was filed. The date of filing of this motion was well
within the time limitation of three months as expressed
in Rule 60 (b) U.R.C.P., and under the circumstances
is unquestionably within a reasonable time as expressed
in the same rule. The appellants not only used due
diligence in the filing of the motion to vacate the judgment, but previous to the entry of judgment they had
used due diligence to defend the action.
In the conversation between the attorneys for appellants and respondent more time had been given in
which to file an answer if appellants' attorney desired.
No where does it appear that the attorney for the respondent told the attorney for the appellant that a default
had already been entered. On the contrary the affidavits
of Paul Dixon and attorney Hansen state that they had
no such knowledge. Without knowledge it would be impossible for them to take further steps to protect themselves. As soon as they became aware of their position
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they did take steps. The respondent's attorney claims
that the answer and counterclaim filed by appellants
was not properly served upon him, but the record shows
that said answer and counterclaim were stricken upon
motion of the plaintiff's attorney on the very same day
that they were filed with the District Court. Proper
service of the answer if given the day the answer was
filed would have added nothing to plaintiffs knowledge.
In its memorandum decision in denying the appellants' motion, the District Court states in substance that
it is not persuaded that the appellants could successfully
defend against the claims of title of the respondents.
This was improper. Such a conclusion was not within
the province of the trial court upon a hearing of the
motion to set aside the default judgment.
Such was this court's holding in the case of Quealy
vs. vVillardson, 35 Ut. 414; 100 Pac. 930. That case was
a foreclosure suit in which judgment was taken by default. The appellant attempted to have the default set
aside on the grounds of excusable neglect. The District
Court entertained the view that if it was made to appear
from the evidence generally that the judgment was right,
then the judgment should not be vacated regardless of
whether there was excusable neglect. The case had been
dormant for six years without an answer being filed.
The supreme court set aside the default. It said:
"All that the court could pass on at the hearing on the motion was whether the appellants had
presented a meritorious defense in their answer,
and whether they had shown sufficient excuse for
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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not presenting the defense at the proper time.
\Vith respect to the merits of the defense, the
appellants had the right to have the court make
specific findings of fact and conclusions of law
and enter judgment accordingly, and from such
judgment they had the right to appeal upon questions of both law and fact. "\Vhen the court however, adjudged the defense of the appellants made
profert as untrue upon the hearing of the motion,
the right of appeal upon those questions was
necessarily cut off. It is also true that the courts
have frequently held that a court will not set aside
a default judgment when the answer which is
tendered upon its face shows that the defense is
unconscionable, dishonest, or purely technical.
(Citing Cases) A defense may however, seem
technical, or even unconscionable, upon its face,
and when all the evidence is heard with respect to
it may, nevertheless, present a good defense to
plaintiff's claim. A Court therefore should be
-..:ery slow in adjudicating in advance of trial what
defenses are or are not meritorious, or whether
the judgment entered by default is the only proper
one in view of all the facts that may be made to
appear in case a trial upon the merits is had.''
'' ... While the courts have the right to require
all litigants to come into court and to present
their claims and defenses in accordance with the
law and rules of procedure, and in case of inexcusable neglect to refuse them a hearing, still
these rules should be enforced so as to reflect
justice between the parties to the action and for
the purpose of -..:indicating the law and maintaining the dignity of the court."
In the lower court the respondents claimed title to
the property under a tax deed from the County and
further claimed title upon adverse possession together

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11

with the payment of taxes. The appellants proposed
answer and counterclaim to the respondent's claim of
title under the tax deeds is that the tax deeds are absolutely void because no auditor's affidavit was ever
issued and therefore the statutory requirements have
not been met. The appellants' proposed answer and
counterclaim to the respondent's claim of title by adverse possession is that the respondents have actually
never been in possession for the statutory period, and
therefore, could not have acquired title by adverse possession. It is clear that if the appellants could sustain
their burden upon the trial on these issues they could
prevail at the trial. It is the trial where such issues
should be determined, not by affidavit supporting a
motion to vacate the judgment. Furthermore, if the
respondents successfully prove title in themselves the
respondents will not be injured by a trial of the issues.
It further does not appear that the respondent would be
injured in any way if the default is set aside. In such a
case it is an unmistakable abuse of discretion on the
part of the District Court to deny the appellants' motion
to set aside the judgment and decree.
II. REoPENING THE CAsE WouLD NoT BE ONLY FoR THE
PuRPOSE oF A CRoss-AcTION BETWEEN CERTAIN oF THE
DEFENDANTs. THE CRoss-AcTION As PERMITTED UNDER
RuLE 13 (f) U.R.C.P. WouLD BE MERELY INciDENTAL
To THE IssuEs BETWEEN THE PARTIES TO THE M~\.IX
AcTION BuT NEcESSARY TO PREVENT INJUSTICE.
This District Court partially based its denial of the
motion to vacate on the grounds that to allow a reopenSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ing of the case would be only for the purpose of a crossaction betWl'en the appellants and the Valley Investment
Company, one of the defendants in the District Court.
It is absolutely essential that the appellants' claims
against the Valley InYestment Company be determined
in this same action. If not, title would be quieted both
against the appellants and the Valley Investment Company in this action. A subsequent case between the
appellants and the Valley Investment Company would
be moot if both are adjudicated therein to have no
interest.

The main purpose the appellants have in defending
the suit is to preclude the respondents from quieting
title to the property. For the District Court to determine
that the only purpose of the suit would be for a crossaction against another defendant is for the court to
erroneously and capriciously assume that the appellants
could not successfully defend the action against the respondents upon a trial of the issues .. For the District
Court to make such an assumption amounts to its passing
judgment before trial-contrary to Quealy vs. Willardson cited above.
However, in order to prevail at the trial of the case
against the respondents, it may be that the appellants
would first have to have a quit-claim deed from Arnold
Dixon, sole surviving director of the Dixon Ranch Company to the Valley Investment Company set aside. In
this regard, the appellants claim that said deed was
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obtained by fraud, and further that Arnold Dixon had
no authority to execute such an instrument, and further
that he did not have the legal capacity to execute such
an instrument.
Rule 1 (a) U.R.C.P. says in part referring to the
scope of the rules :
''They shall be liberally construed to secure
the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of
every action.''
To force the appellants to bring a separate action
against the Valley Investment Company would cause
unnecessary circuity of action which would certainly not
be "just, speedy, and inexpensive", if then the appellants had to bring another action against the plaintiff
who is now before the court, and as stated above, it
would be a useless proceeding.
Rule 13 (f) U.R.C.P. would permit such a crossaction. It provides :
''A pleading may state as a cross-claim any
claim by one party against a co-party arising out
of the original action or of a counter-claim therein
or relating to any property that is the subject
matter of the original action. Such cross-claim
may include a claim that the party against whom
it is asserted is or may be liable to the crossclaimant for all of part of a claim asserted in the
action against the cross-claimant.''
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SUMMARY
In conclusion, the record shows facts constituting
excusable neglect within the meaning of Rule 60 (b)
U.R.P.C. The facts further show that the appellants
have prosecuted their rights with due diligence. The
facts are so strong and unmistakably clear that the
District Court's denial of the appellant's motion to
vacate the default judgment was an abuse of its discretion. The motion should be granted, and the appellants
should be allowed to enter its answer and counterclaim
and be permitted to defend the action.
Respectfully submitted,

CLYDE & MECHAM
Attorneys for .Appella;nt

By Robert C. Gibson
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